The Tipping Point in the Law\u27s Use of Science:  The Epidemic of Scientific Sophistication That Began With DNA Profiling and Toxic Torts by Faigman, David L.
Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 67
Issue 1
SYMPOSIUM:
DNA Lessons From the Past - Problems For the
Future
Article 6
9-1-2001
The Tipping Point in the Law's Use of Science: The
Epidemic of Scientific Sophistication That Began
With DNA Profiling and Toxic Torts
David L. Faigman
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
David L. Faigman, The Tipping Point in the Law's Use of Science: The Epidemic of Scientific Sophistication That Began With DNA Profiling
and Toxic Torts, 67 Brook. L. Rev. 111 (2001).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol67/iss1/6
THE TIPPING POINT IN THE LAW'S USE OF
SCIENCE: THE EPIDEMIC OF SCIENTIFIC
SOPHISTICATION THAT BEGAN WITH
DNA PROFILING AND TOXIC TORTS*
David L. Faigmant
INTRODUCTION
Why did Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.'
happen when it did? The Daubert Court held that trial court
judges are the keepers of the gate through which expert
testimony must pass. As gatekeepers, judges must evaluate the
basis for proffered expert testimony and determine whether it
is relevant and reliable.2 The basic lesson of Daubert is that
judges must sufficiently understand the scientific method to
effectively do their jobs. This task was new and, indeed,
revolutionary.' But why did it take until 1993 for the U.S.
Supreme Court to impart this lesson? After all, by 1993, the
scientific revolution was at least three centuries old, and the
Federal Rules of Evidence, ostensibly the subject of Daubert,
were nearly two decades old. Why did it take so long for the
courts to discover science? In this Article, I suggest that this is
* ©2001 David L. Faigman. All Rights Reserved.
t University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I would especially like
to thank my colleague Evan Lee, who helped me develop the thesis for this Article with
ideas and comments during our various journeys to far-flung golf courses along the
California coast. I am also grateful to Margaret Berger and Lisa Snyder for their
comments, suggestions, and generous encouragement.
1501 U.S. 579 (1993).
2 Id. at 597 (referring to judges' "gatekeeping role" under FED. R. EVID. 702).
3 See David L. Faigman, The Law's Scientific Revolution: Reflections and
Ruminations on the Law's Use of Experts in Year Seven of the Revolution, 57 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 661 (2000).
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the wrong question. The better question is, what happened in
the early 1990s that made Daubert inevitable? The short
answer to this question is that scientific evidence hit "the
tipping point," and since then a judicial recognition of science
has surged across the legal landscape. DNA profiling was an
essential component of this phenomenon.
The phenomenon known as "the tipping point" has
received substantial attention in scholarly literature4 and,
recently, in the popular press.5 In brief, the tipping point refers
to the moment in time when an event breaks out of a state of
equilibrium and either accelerates or decelerates at an
enormous rate. Phenomena ranging from the rocketing sales of
Hush Puppies shoes in 19956 to the AIDS epidemic7 have been
explained in these terms. Given the right set of circumstances,
a product like the first Harry Potter book, which began as a
moderately successful children's story, could explode seemingly
overnight into an international phenomenon. In the early
1990s, scientific evidence, similarly, hit the tipping point.
Although not quite as sensational a success as Harry Potter,
Justice Harry Blackmun's Daubert decision might yet prove
more enduring.
I began my teaching and writing career not long before
scientific evidence hit the tipping point. In fact, the principal
theme of my early scholarship revolved around my belief that
those in the legal profession needed to become more
sophisticated consumers of science.' But it was an idea whose
time had not yet come. My first major article on the subject
dropped into the sea with hardly a ripple. In that article, I
advocated a validity standard for scientific evidence.9 Having
attended graduate school in psychology just a few years
before-one with a rigorous scientific culture-this was not a
4 For an excellent scholarly introduction to the subject of "tipping points," see
EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS (4th ed. 1995).
5 MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A
BIG DIFFERENCE (2000).(Id. at 3-5.
7 GABRIEL ROTELLO, SEXUAL ECOLOGY: AIDS AND THE DESTINY OF GAY MEN
(1997).
, David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social
Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005 (1989).
9 Id. at 1009 ("The legal relevance of social science findings should depend on
their scientific strength, that is, on the ability of social scientists to answer validly the
questions posed to them.").
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revolutionary proposal for me to make. To the legal
community, however, it posed a fundamental paradox, since
most lawyers had scant training in the scientific method. As I
explained then, "[niot until lawmakers understand the basic
methods of social science are they likely to substantively rely
upon research findings. Yet, in order for the investment in
learning basic research methods to appear worthwhile,
lawmakers must perceive a substantial need for this
knowledge."0
Judges had to understand science in order to appreciate
the need for it, and they had to be convinced of the need for it
before they would invest the time to understand it. At that
time, I saw no solution to this paradox. I recommended more
education, believing that if only judges could be convinced of
the value of science, they would begin to employ that
knowledge. This proposal was doomed to failure. Education
might be integral to guiding and maintaining later reforms,
but it could not tip the balance toward reform. That stimulus
would have to come from the law's own docket.
Little did I expect, however much I hoped, that the
situation I was decrying was about to change dramatically. It
turned out that I was looking in the wrong direction. My focus
in 1989 was on social science, but the tidal wave of change was
coming entirely from two other directions. The two main areas
heralding the scientific revolution in law came from toxic torts
and DNA profiling. In a very brief period of time, around 1989
and culminating in 1993 with Daubert, the legal profession
tipped so that enough lawyers and judges came to realize that
it was worth their time to learn basic research methods. The
equilibrium then shifted. Like all epidemics, scientific
sophistication among lawyers began with a few contagious
individuals, people who then infected others. From that point
onward, an appreciation of the need to understand science has
truly spread like an epidemic through the legal community.
Although no single set of factors applies to all
phenomena that have reached the tipping point, three in
particular can be instrumental in achieving this state of
affairs. These three are the "power of context," the "law of the
" Faigman, supra note 8, at 1081.
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few," and the "stickiness factor."" The first refers to the
environment and concerns whether it is conducive to the
spread of the particular phenomenon. The second, the "law of
the few," provides that a small number of well-connected and
influential people can effect huge changes. The third, the
"stickiness factor," refers to whether the phenomenon is highly
contagious or sufficiently memorable to leave an indelible
impression as it passes through the community. Around 1990,
all three factors were sufficiently present for scientific evidence
to reach the tipping point. In this Article, I explore the ways in
which these factors converged. 2 Moreover, I consider the extent
to which we can expect the law to remain "tipped."
I. THE POWER OF CONTEXT
To a large extent, the tipping of a virus from scattered
groups of illness to mass epidemic is a matter of numbers.
Malcolm Gladwell offers the following hypothetical flu
epidemic to illustrate the point.
Suppose, for example, that one summer 1,000 tourists come to
Manhattan from Canada carrying an untreatable strain of twenty-
four-hour virus. This strain of flu has a 2 percent infection rate,
which is to say that one out of every 50 people who come into close
contact with someone carrying it catches the bug himself. Let's say
that 50 is also exactly the number of people the average
Manhattanite-in the course of riding the subways and mingling
with colleagues at work-come into contact with every day. What we
have, then, is a disease in equilibrium. Those 1,000 Canadian
tourists pass on the virus to 1,000 new people on the day they arrive.
11 GLADWELL, supra note 5, at 29.
12 Given the inherently scientific perspective of this Article, I should note at the
start that my observations regarding the tipping point of scientific evidence are
hypotheses only. To be sure, they are hypotheses based on good research conducted in
other contexts. See generally ROGERS, supra note 4. However, until they are tested,
they remain largely theoretical. Whether these hypotheses would themselves be
admissible under a Daubert standard is an interesting question. Most applied science
relevant in the law depends on generalizations made from research that has not
directly tested the hypothesis of interest to the law. Toxicological research tests
suspected toxins on animals, not people, and jury research tends to use college
sophomores, not real jurors. In any case, I would certainly welcome some enterprising
graduate student or social scientist to research my hypotheses on the tipping point of
scientific evidence. Until then, I will continue the tried and true practice of lawyers,
that of positing hypotheses about the world from the comfort of my armchair.
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And the next day those 1,000 newly infected people pass on the virus
to another 1,000 people, just as the original 1,000 tourists who
started the epidemic are returning to health. With those getting sick
and those getting well so perfectly in balance, the flu chugs along at
a steady but unspectacular clip through the rest of the summer and
the fall.
But then comes the Christmas season. The subways and buses
get more crowded with tourists and shoppers, and instead of running
into an even 50 people a day, the average Manhattanite now has
close contact with, say, 55 people a day. All of a sudden, the
equilibrium is disrupted. The 1,000 flu carriers now run into 55,000
people a day, and at a 2 percent infection rate, that translates into
1,100 cases the following day. Those 1,100, in turn, are now passing
on their virus to 55,000 people as well, so that by day three there are
1,210 Manhattanites with the flu and by day four 1,331 and by the
end of the week there are nearly 2,000 and so on up, in an
exponential spiral, until Manhattan has a full-blown flu epidemic on
its hands by Christmas day. That moment when the average flu
carrier went from running into 50 people a day to running into 55
people was the Tipping Point. It was the point at which an ordinary
and stable phenomenon-a low-level flu outbreak-turned into a
public health crisis.
1 3
By 1990, the number of cases infected with scientific
evidence, like Gladwell's Manhattan flu carriers, was piling up.
The 1980s saw a major epidemic of tort litigation.4 Much of
this epidemic was fueled by cases involving Agent Orange, 5
asbestos, 6 the Dalkon Shield, and Bendectin1 8 To a greater
and lesser extent, these cases presented complex issues
regarding deducing causation from science. More importantly,
however, the numbers alone created a crisis. Hundreds of
thousands of lawsuits were quickly overwhelming the legal
system's ability to operate.' 9
13 GLADWELL, supra note 5, at 260-61 (endnotes for page 12).14 See Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal
Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 961, 961 (1993) ("The
1980s marked the era of mass personal injury litigation.").
'
5 See PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL (1986).
"See PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT (1985).17 See RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW (1991).
is See MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS (1996); Joseph
Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 301 (1992).19 Hensler & Peterson, supra note 14, at 961.
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Indeed, given the sheer numbers involved, one might
have thought that the tipping point would have been reached
five to ten years earlier. Early on, however, these cases were
not specifically perceived as involving problems with scientific
evidence. The epidemic at this point was in tort litigation, not
scientific evidence. Issues surrounding management of class
action suits and discovery rules occupied most courts' and
scholars' attention. The reason for this was that most of the
early toxic tort litigation did not involve controversial science
or, to the extent that it did, courts were focused elsewhere. The
scientific proof in the asbestos and the Dalkon Shield
litigations, in particular, was very strong. The issue was not
whether the substances caused the claimed ailments, but how
best to handle the onslaught of litigation in order to ensure just
and reasonable outcomes.
The situation, however, was different with the
Bendectin litigation-which appropriately became the subject
of the Daubert decision. Whether Bendectin caused birth
defects was hotly disputed. With the Bendectin litigation,
judges began to appreciate the complexity surrounding basic
claims of scientific causation. Strange concepts such as
epidemiological analysis and meta analysis began to trickle
into court opinions. 0 Still, the Bendectin litigation was well
contained and, at least until Daubert, would not infect a large
number of courts. Most of the claims were resolved, in the
defendants' favor, in one consolidated trial in 1985.21 But times
were changing. The new reality was beginning to settle on the
judiciary.
This reality was starkly presented in another
monumental event of the 1980s, the development of DNA
profiling. The technique was invented in 1985 at Leicester
University by Alec Jeffreys and his colleagues. It was put to
almost immediate use when it was employed in July of that
year to support Christina Sarbah's claim, in an immigration
dispute, that a Ghanian boy was her son.22 It was used again in
1986 to prove the innocence of a seventeen-year-old hospital
20 See, e.g., Daubert, 509 U.S. at 583-84 (Justice Blackmun refers to meta
analysis as "reanalysis" in his opinion.).
21 See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 14, at 979.
22 First "Gene" Rape Conviction, CHI. SUN TIMES, Nov. 14, 1987, 1987 WL
4120263.
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worker suspected of two murders in Leicester.2 In November
1987, the first conviction based partly on "genetic
fingerprinting" was rendered in London.' The defendant was
convicted of raping a forty-three-year-old disabled woman after
DNA from his blood matched DNA in the semen found on the
victim's clothing.'
Given the tremendous power and utility of this new
technology, its immediate popularity was not surprising. Of
greater consequence, however, was the fact that judges
immediately realized the need to understand something about
science in order to use this powerful new tool. Unlike the
perceived advantage of the other identification sciences, such
as fingerprinting or ballistics, the matching characteristics
could not be seen at all and they could not be understood
without a refresher course in basic biology.26 Even courts
applying the general acceptance test from Frye27 wrote opinions
replete with terms from molecular biology and population
statistics.' In addition, the new science spread quickly through
the case lawY.2 These cases, of course, are not all DNA profiling
23Id.
24Id.
2Id.
26 The perceived differences between DNA profiling and the other forensic
sciences are merely illusory. As forensic scientists, and the prosecutors who employ
them, are beginning to learn, all matching sciences, from ballistics to hair, are
probabilistic. The difference is that today we have a pretty good idea of the
probabilities associated with DNA, but, since the research has yet to be done, little is
known of the error rates associated with many other forensic sciences.
2See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
" See, e.g., State v. Pennington, 393 S.E.2d 847 (N.C. 1990).
"A quick and dirty study done of the allstates and allfeds data fields on
Westlaw on March 4, 2001, found the following numbers of cases citing the letters
"DNA."
Dates Allstates Allfeds
1985-1986 3 7
1987-1988 17 24
1989-1990 92 40
1991-1992 245 55
1993-1994 401 86
1995-1995 605 184
1997-1998 822 177
1999-2000 1116 204
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cases and many do not delve into the details of either the
science or the technology. Nonetheless, and in due recognition
of the limitations of my hurried data collection, the numbers
roughly support my general thesis. Over the 1990s, the courts
increasingly confronted DNA and other scientific subjects to
the point at which their need to understand and deal with the
subject became unavoidable. The DNA helix became a new
icon.30 The courts found themselves in a new position. They
were on the cutting edge of science.
The context was thus ripe for tipping to occur in the
law's use of science. Especially across the torts frontier, science
was increasingly a huge presence that had to be handled. In
addition, to the extent mass toxic lawsuits were thought to be
spiraling out of control, greater supervision of the underlying
science offered a possible solution. At the same time, the new
science of DNA profiling hit courts suddenly and in great
numbers. DNA profiling required judges to understand certain
basic concepts of biology and elementary statistics. Scientific
evidence was beginning to tip, and all that it needed was a few
influential people to push it over.
II. THE LAW OF THE FEW
People are social animals and we get many of our best
ideas from those around us. The clothes we wear, the style of
our hair, and the restaurants we frequent are all affected by
our friends and acquaintances. However, some people affect us
more than others. This influence stems mainly from their
individual characteristics, so that someone with great
charisma, who begins wearing excessively baggy pants, will
influence others to follow suit. How much influence this
"change agent" has is proportional to the number of people
with whom he or she interacts.31 Therefore, if a cool person
I would, of course, welcome a more sophisticated and detailed test of my
hypothesis that the courts were obligated to learn science partly because of the
growing onslaught of DNA cases.
3' See DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE GENE
AS A CULTURAL ICON (1996).
31 Professor Rogers defines a "change agent" as "an individual who influences
clients' innovation-decisions in a direction deemed desirable by a change agency."
ROGERS, supra note 4, at 335. He notes further that the "agent usually seeks to secure
the adoption of new ideas, but he or she may also attempt to slow the diffusion process
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pierces her nose, or he gets a tattoo, by following suit, we can
be cool too. The more people this cool person knows, the more
baggy pants and tattoos will be seen on the streets. In the law,
science has become very cool.
A popular parlor game called "Six Degrees of Kevin
Bacon" illustrates the basic premise of the law of the few. The
objective of the game is to link any actor to Kevin Bacon by
associating that actor with other actors who, through as few
series of associations as can be identified, can be linked to a
movie he or she appeared in with Kevin Bacon. For instance,
Humphrey Bogart was in The Wagons Roll at Night 2 (1941)
with Eddie Albert and Eddie Albert was in The Big Picture33
(1989) with Kevin Bacon. Thus, Humphrey Bogart has only two
degrees of separation. In contrast, Carole Lombard was in
Show Business in War 4 (1943) with Mickey Rooney and Mickey
Rooney was in Silent Night, Deadly Night 5: The Toy Maker"
(1992) with Clint Howard: Clint Howard was in My Dog Skip36
(2000) with Kevin Bacon. Carole Lombard has three degrees of
separation.
"Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon" is a Hollywood version of a
social science study conducted by Stanley Milgram in the
1960s. Milgram was interested in seeing just how small a
world we live in, so he sought to measure our
interconnectedness. Milgram asked 160 people in Omaha,
Nebraska to send a packet to someone whom they believed
could get it to a particular stockbroker in the Boston area. The
idea was that the Omaha resident would send it to someone
they knew near Boston, and that person would send it on to
someone else, and so on until the packet arrived at the
stockbroker's home or office. Milgram found that most of the
packets arrived after passing through five or six separate
hands. Thus, the name of the game.
and prevent the adoption of certain innovations with undesirable effects." Id.
32 THE WAGONS ROLL AT NIGHT (Warner Bros. 1941).
3THE BIG PIcTURE (Columbia Pictures 1989).
SHOW BUSINESS IN WAR (Bridgestone Multimedia 1943).
3 SILENT NIGHT, DEADLY NIGHT 5: THE TOY MAKER (Artisan Entertainment
1992).
36 MY DOG SKIP (Warner Bros. 2000).
37 Stanley Milgram, The Small World Problem, 1 PSYCHOL. TODAY 60
(1967). The Milgram study is discussed at length in GLADWELL, supra note 5, at 34-38.
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The truly interesting discovery of Milgram's study was
that about half of all the packets reached the stockbroker
through just three people. Thus, it was not that all people are
well connected through only six degrees of separation. We are
all connected through a relatively small number of highly
connected individuals. In the case of Kevin Bacon, for example,
in a study conducted by Brett TIjaden, he ranked only 669th of
all of the actors studied for the average number of degrees of
separation.38 Rod Steiger ranked number one.
Steiger's success as a "connector" is attributable to both
the large number of movies he made and their great variety.
The large number of movies increased the number of actors
with whom he worked, and the variety exposed him to actors
and actresses of varying genres. Connectors' success, therefore,
depends on the number of people they know and the number of
networks to which they belong. Connectors can be particularly
effective if they create bridges between otherwise insulated
groups. At the same time, however, it is not clear that Steiger
made the best "change agent," because he did not have the
charisma of a Bogart or a Grant. The game, after all, is not
called "Six Degrees of Rod Steiger." The number of people
someone knows is extremely important, but a good change
agent must also have the power to persuade. In the law, this is
especially true.
The most "connected" and, in formal terms, the most
persuasive, legal institution is the U.S. Supreme Court.
Although scientific evidence could have tipped without the
Court, eventually the Court would either have to put its
imprimatur on the phenomenon, or try and stop it. The Court
opted to join the fray sooner rather than later. And when the
Court granted certiorari in Daubert, there was little doubt that
Justice Blackmun would write the opinion if he were in the
majority.
Justice Blackmun was long known for his active interest
in science. Before writing Roe v. Wade,39 he spent a summer
researching medical issues surrounding pregnancy at the Mayo
Clinic, where years earlier he had been general counsel. In Roe,
he used the medical concept of viability to set the time at which
38 GLADWELL, supra note 5, at 47. Tjaden's study and results, called the "Oracle
of Bacon," can be found at http'J/www.cs.virginia.edu/oracle/.
39 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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the government's interest in the life of the fetus became
compelling." Five years later, Justice Blackmun authored
Ballew v. Georgia," an opinion that relied extensively on
empirical research.42 Ballew set the constitutional floor at six
for the size of criminal juries.43 Justice Blackmun, thus, was
perfectly situated to give the final shove to fell a phenomenon
that was already teetering and about to tip over. At first,
however, Daubert did not constitute this final shove. Only later
would it come to symbolize the tipping of scientific evidence. In
the summer of 1993, just after the decision, Daubert was still a
sign that pointed in several directions.
The Supreme Court might be the ultimate "change
agent." But the pronouncements it hands down, though bearing
great authority, need to be picked up by those in the field. The
Court's will can be frustrated when those around it are hostile
to its directives. Adding to this sometimes institutional inertia,
or outright hostility, the Daubert opinion itself was
maddeningly equivocal. The opinion spoke simultaneously of
the liberality of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the pressing
need to have judges screen scientific evidence as gatekeepers.
Both plaintiffs' attorneys, who preferred liberal admissibility
standards, and civil defense lawyers, who preferred the
opposite, declared victory after the case was decided."
The tipping of scientific evidence was assisted hugely,
and largely ensured, by a relatively small number of judges
devoted to handling scientific evidence who, together,
represented an extraordinarily influential group of people.
Early on, before Daubert, judges such as Jack Weinstein,45
40 Id. at 163.
41435 U.S. 223 (1978).
42 It should be noted, however, that, in Ballew, Blackmun's "treatment of the
statistical literature [was], at best, careless." David H. Kaye, And Then There Were
Twelve: Statistical Reasoning, the Supreme Court, and the Size of the Jury, 68 CAL. L.
REV. 1004, 1008 (1980).
43 Ballew, 435 U.S. at 239 ("[T]hese studies... lead us to conclude that the
purpose and functioning of the jury in a criminal trial is seriously impaired, and to a
constitutional degree, by a reduction in size to below six members.").
4See P. Kevin Castel, Bye to "Frye": High Court Sets Standards for Admitting
Expert Testimony, N.Y.L.J., July 8, 1993, at 1.
4* See, e.g., Eliot Marshal, New York Courts Seek "Neutral" Experts, 272 Scd.
189 (1996); see also Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes
Towards a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COL-M. L. REV. 2117 (1997).
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Edward Becker,46 and William Schwarzer recognized the
impact science would have on the law, and shaped decisions to
handle it. For example, brilliantly anticipating Daubert, the
Federal Judicial Center, headed at the time by Judge
Schwarzer, began compiling the Reference Manual on Scientific
Evidence, which was published shortly after Daubert was
handed down.47 After Daubert, judges such as Robert Jones,48
Samuel Pointer,49 and Nancy Gertner 0 helped define Daubert's
scope and direction. Also instrumental in sustaining the tipped
state of scientific evidence was Justice Breyer, both for his
opinion in Kumho Tire Ltd. v. Carmichael,51 and his statements
in favor of a liberal use of court appointed experts." Combined
with the influence of these and other judges, academics and the
Federal Judicial Center contributed mightily to the sense of
momentum that is an integral part of any tipping point.
III. THE STICKINESS FACTOR
The stickiness factor refers to how memorable or
contagious the phenomenon is, in and of itself. Science does not
exhibit a great deal of stickiness initially, especially among
those without a background in the subject. Undoubtedly, this
lack of stickiness contributed to the courts taking several
centuries to join the scientific revolution. But science becomes
sticky once it is learned. At that point, like gum on the bottom
of your shoe on a hot summer day, it is impossible to get
unstuck.
The stickiness factor probably was not highly
instrumental in leading to the tipping point of scientific
evidence. DNA profiling, however, might have contributed
somewhat along this dimension. Just as the atom symbolized
the mid to late twentieth century, the DNA helix is the symbol
46 See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985) (cited
in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591).
" REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (1994).48 See, e.g., Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996).
49 See, e.g., In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Product Liability Litigation,
MDL-926, Order No. 31E (Oct. 31, 1996).50 See, e.g., United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999).
51 526 U.S. 137 (1999).52 See Stephen Breyer, Introduction to REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 1 (2d ed. 2000).
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of our times.53 DNA profiling was a component of a much larger
and more profound revolution in biotechnology. The human
genome, and all that it entails, is one of the biggest issues, as
well as one of the most exciting and disturbing, confronting our
society today. Undoubtedly, the new science of DNA and the
biological science and ethical issues swirling around it-from
cloning to stem cells-have a sticky quality to them.
Still, DNA was a relatively small part of the tipping
that was happening across the law's frontier. A judge could,
perhaps, learn enough biology and statistics to handle DNA
profiling and possibly the occasional intellectual property
dispute that might arise involving the subject. But what about
all of the other scientific and quasi-scientific fields that could
be seen along the horizon? There were many sciences, all
rather less sticky, and many having the potential to
overwhelm, either in their complexity or their great numbers.
Toxicology, epidemiology, psychology and the forensic sciences
had all been around for quite some time, and all had been
readily ignored. Was it not possible to learn some science,
without going all the way? It turns out that the answer is no.
Science is just too sticky once it is understood.
Thomas Huxley, popularly known as "Darwin's bulldog"
and a first-class scientist himself, referred to science as
nothing more than "organized common sense.""' But it is a
common sense that is an acquired taste. Once that taste is
acquired, however, it is difficult not to judge everything one
tastes by it. That is what is happening in the law today. This
sort of stickiness means that this is one tipping point
phenomenon that will not wane like pet rocks or Hush Puppies.
The phenomenon is something like what happens to generation
after generation of first-year law students. In that first
semester, they begin learning exciting new ways of thinking
about car accidents, widget manufacturing, and criminal
assault. Thinking like a lawyer is a new way of critical
thinking and the young lawyer has been given a new pair of
lenses through which to see the world. Soon, it is hard for them
to avoid describing everything they see through these new
lenses. In fact, at Thanksgiving get-togethers, it is not
See NELKIN & LINDEE, supra note 30.
THOMAS HUXLEY, COLLECTED ESSAYS, THE METHOD OF ZADIG (1894-94)
(quoted in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 358 (4th ed. 1992)).
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uncommon to see the first-year law student shunned into a
corner because his or her family has heard enough. But it is
impossible to disinvent the wheel. Once you have seen the
world through Mrs. Palsgrafs eyes, your idea of causation is
forever changed. In the same way, once you have seen the
world through Richard Feynman's eyes, your idea of proof of
causation is forever changed.
In 1989, at a forum on DNA profiling at John Marshall
Law School, Senator Paul Simon called the new technology the
greatest advance in crime fighting since fingerprinting."
Ironically, the revolution in scientific sophistication led by
DNA profiling has caused a reexamination of fingerprinting."
A host of other forensic sciences are also under increased
scrutiny. 7 The simple reason for this is the stickiness of
science. A judge who understands elementary concepts, such as
base rates in DNA profiling, is apt to question how they were
derived for the points of identification in fingerprinting. It
turns out that those base rates were never derived for
fingerprinting. Although to date no published opinion has
sustained an objection to fingerprinting, that day may not be
far off.
The law is still in the initial stages of the tipping effect,
and its dealings with science remain highly variable. As with
other examples of the tipping point, the infection has not yet
raged completely through the population. Indeed, it might
never reach everyone or encompass all legal subjects. But there
is little doubt that we are in the midst of an epidemic, and
there are good reasons to expect it to continue to spread largely
unabated. Although scientists use a wide variety of research
strategies and statistical tests, most science conforms to
certain basic logical principles. Moreover, most of the science,
quasi-science, pseudo-science, and non-science proffered in
American courtrooms is not complicated. Areas of expertise
including psychology, sociology, toxicology, epidemiology,
clinical medicine, engineering, biology, anthropology, and the
forensic sciences are readily understandable to the average
55 Peter Gorner & Ronald Kotulak, Police Fighting Crime with New DNA
Weapon, CHI. TRIB., May 26, 1989, 1989 WL 4588734.
56 See Fingering Fingerprints, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 16, 2000 at 89.
57 See, e.g., United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999)
(handwriting identification analysis).
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judge. More importantly, the failures of those sciences are
easily identified if the average judge is paying attention. More
and more, since the subject tipped, average judges are paying
attention.
CONCLUSION
Scientific evidence has tipped. Symposia such as this
one, as well as the myriad of programs on science being run by
state, federal and private organizations for lawyers and judges,
all reflect-and perpetuate-this phenomenon. The rage for
science today can be traced to three factors prevalent at the
end of the 1980s and the start of the 1990s which triggered it;
these are the "power of context," the "law of the few," and the
"stickiness factor." The context was ripe around 1990 because
the courts were increasingly inundated with toxic tort cases
and the new DNA profiling technology. It was becoming
glaringly obvious that judges needed to develop an
understanding of basic scientific and statistical methods to
manage this onslaught. In addition, around this time there
were a relatively small group of highly influential judges who
believed that the law had to actively take control of the
growing tide of science, pseudo-science, and bad science being
proffered in court. These few were well-situated to greatly
influence the many who doubted and fought the rising tide.
Finally, as judges began thinking not just like lawyers but also
like scientists, they began to exercise this new-found vision
across the spectrum of experts vying to testify. Knowledge of
the scientific method proved sticky, and lawyers and judges
have begun sticking it to all sorts of experts ever since.
The law has joined the scientific revolution, largely as a
result of the impossibility of it avoiding this fate. Not until
around 1990, however, were the circumstances sufficiently
conducive for this to occur. Now that it has, much still needs to
be done to manage this new state of affairs. But it is worth
pausing for a moment to welcome the new regime and to rejoice
in the new enlightenment. Law, and possibly many scientific
fields, will never be quite the same. For that, we should be
grateful indeed.
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